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RECORD IN A COURT OF LAST .RESORT 667 
SHOULD RECORD IN A COURT OF LAST RESORT 
CONSIST ONLY OF THE OPINION IN THE 
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT? 
BY JosEPH M. CoRMACK 
Professor of Law, University of Southern California 
IT is believed that there may be some value in drawing distinctions on principle between the functions of trial courts, intermediate appellate 
courts, and courts of last resort. It may be sug-
gested that it is the function of the trial court to 
find the facts, the function of the intermediate ap-
pellate court to apply the law to the facts, and the 
function of the court of last resort to develop the 
jurisprudence of the jurisdiction. 
These distinctions, if. their validity be estab-
lished, offer an aid in the solution of the problem 
of delay in the administration of justice, in so far 
as it relates to appellate courts. They also indicate 
that a judicial system should include courts of the 
three categories. For convenience the intermediate 
.appellate court will be referred to as the Appellate 
Court, and the court of last resort as the Supreme 
Court. · · 
It has been said that it is the function of the 
trial court to find the facts. It is obvious that evi-
dence is. introduced, and verdicts received, only in 
the trial court. While the legal questions involved 
are disposed of to the best of the ability of the trial 
judge, the primary function of the trial court is to 
ascertain the facts. One of the chief reasons for 
the existence of appellate courts is the impossibility 
of making adequate application of legal principles 
under the conditions inevitably inherent in trial 
court practice. It is the sole function of the Appel-
late Court to apply the law to the facts, doing this 
only after careful examination of briefs and tran-
script. From the present standpoint the overlap-
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ping which occurs is incidental, and it is believed 
that it does not affect the validity of the distinction 
suggested. · 
However, the distinction with which the pres-
ent discussion is primarily concerned is that sug-
gested between the Appellate and Supreme courts. 
It is submitted that the responsibility of the Appel-
late Court in applying legal principles to the facts 
for the benefit of individual litigants should be final, 
and that the Supreme Court should devote itself 
exclusively to the public interests involved. These 
are represented by the effects of the litigation upon 
the jurisprudence of the future. If such is to be 
the function of the Supreme Court, the only portion 
of the proceeclings in the lower courts with which 
it is concerned is that which constitutes the mate-
rials of the jurisprudence of the future, the pub-
lishecl opinions. It therefore seems reasonable to 
conclude that tl1e record in the Supreme Court 
should consist only of the opinion below, and it is 
believed that if such were to be the case important 
and beneficial results would follow. 
The principle upon which this suggestion is 
based has already been recognized, in so far as pub-
lic policy has been taken into account in granting 
writs of error, etc., or in determining, by legislative 
enactment, the dasses of cases in which appeals 
are to be allowed. Mr. Chief J usticc Taft has said: 
"The theory is that where there is a trial court and one 
appellate court, the litigants, so far as doing justice is con-
cerned, should be satisfied with the decision of the appellate 
court, and, that that decision should be brought to the Supreme 
Court only when the principle to be settled by the Supreme 
Court· will be useful to the public in settling general laws."' 
Mr. Justice Cardozo has said that the Court 
of Appeals of New York exists, "not for the indi-
vidual litigants, but for the great mass of litigants, 
whose causes are potentially involved in the spe-
cific cause at issue. The wrong-s of aggrieved suit-
ors are only the algebraic symbols from which the 
court is to work out the formula of justice."2 
A responsibility can be effectively discharged 
only once. If an attempt be made to repeat it, only 
the second act is effective. The scientific way to 
organize a judicial system is to have each function 
performed once, and only once, and that once as 
well as possible. The Supreme Court should be 
limited to a function different from that of the 
Appellate Court. 
It is true that the litigant does not like to 
admit defeat until the last appeal has been decided. 
He likes to feel that he is carrying every point in 
the case to higher arid still higher tribunals. But 
these circumstances should not be permitted to 
govern the nature of the organization of the judi-
cial system. A keen observer has declared that at 
present "our judicial system is tophcavy. and places 
too much emphasis upon appeals." 3 Litigants are 
also citizens and taxpayers, and in the end all mem-
bers of the community are best served bv the devel-
opment of a great. well co-ordinated, carefully 
thought out system of jurisprudence. It can hardly 
be said that in passing upon the desirability of the 
1. Statement Quoted (1931). Third Renort. Judicial Council of 
California, 45, A similar statement by Mr. Chief Justice Taft is to be 
found in an article written by him, "The Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court Under the Act of Feb. 12, 1025" (1925), 35 Yale L. J. 1, 2, 
2. Statement q1,1oted, 'Valter F. Dodd, "The Problems of Apl)el~ 
late Courts" (1930) 6 Amer. Law School Rev. 681, 689, citing Van 
Bergh ... The Jurisdiction of the: Court of Appeals of New York" 
(1928), 19. 
3. Walter F. Dodd. "The Problems of Appellate Courts" (1980), 
G Amer. Law School Rev. 681, 693, 
present proposal it is necessary to make a balanc-
ing of interests, as the individual litigant has no 
legitimate interest which will not be adequately 
protected. 
The saving of effort upon the part of members 
of the Supreme Court, if the record before them is 
to consist only of an opinion, is manifest. Mr. Jus-
tice Cardozo has noted the contrast between the 
volume of the cases in which the controversy in-
volves only the application of the law to the facts, 
and the importance of those which are to influence 
the jurisprudence of the future.4 He has related 
how differences of opinion in regard to the facts 
develop among the members of the court, and oc-
cupy their time.• 
It has been suggested that in a judicial system 
promptness is essential in the disposition of indi-
vidual cases, whereas' deliberation is necessary in 
the determination of principles which are to be ap-
plicable to future cases.• In these regards the pres-
ent suggestion achieves the desirable result of blow-
ing hot and cold at the same time. Its effect in 
expediting the decision of individual cases is ob-
vious. The energies released from the examination 
of facts will find an outlet in the more careful con-
sideration of the legal principles enunciated. 
It will also be possible for the Supreme Court 
properly to handle a much larger number of cases. 
As any published opinion may affect the jurispru-
dence of the future, it is desirable that every opin-
i?n be passed upon by the Supreme Court if pos-
sible. Unc.ler the proposed plan this will be feasible, 
at least in nearly all jurisdictions. The expedient 
of excluding- cases from consideration by the Su-
preme Court has been resorted to only because of 
physical limitations! 
It has been said that the two chief defects of 
appellate courts are uncertainty of jurisdiction and 
double appeals.• It would seem that the first defect 
could be eliminated entirely, in connection with the 
present suggestion, by making all cases appealable 
to both higher <:ourts. The objectionable features 
of the second would be removed by the nature of 
the proposed appeal to the Supreme Court, fulfilling 
a function different from that of the Appellate 
Court. Under the suggested plan divisions of the 
Supreme Court would not be nccessary.9 "One 
man opinions" should disappear. Longer oral argu-
ments would be possible, if desired in important 
cases. McCulloch v. Maryland was argued in the 
United States Supreme Court for nine days. 
The utmost simplicity of procedure in the Su-
preme Court would be possible. Appeals could well 
be made automatic."' Under such a system, the 
Appellate Court would refer its opinion to the Su-
4. "The Nature uf the Ju.<..licial Process" (1921), 163. 
5. Ibid. 165. 
6. Walter F. DodJ. "The Pwhlems of Appellate Courts" (1930), 
6 Amer. Law School Rev. 681, 686. 
7. 04The history of latter-day judiciary Acts is largdy the story 
of restricting the right of appeal to the Supreme Court." Felix Frank· 
furter, "The Business of the Supreme Court of the United Sta.tes" 
(1926), 39 Harv. L. Rev. 325, 3H; also see 358. 
8. Edson R. Sunderland, '"Intermediate Appellate Courts7 ' (1030), 
14 J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 54, 56. 
9. For a discussion of the objections to divisions. see Witltfr F. 
Dodd, "The Problems of Appellate Court•" (1930), 6 Amer. Law 
School Rev. 681, 689. 
10. "The Military Code contains three provisions which place it 
far ahead of ar;y state code, in point of justice to the accused. First, 
every felony-judgment (general court-martial, in technical terms) goes 
automatically for review on appeal to a superior law authority." John 
H. \Vigmore, 4 'The Mitchell .Court-Martial" (1920), 20 Tll. Rev. 487, 
488; to the same effect, John H. \VIigmore, "O.magogic Abuse of Courts· 
Martial: The Mitchell Trial" (1926), 20 III. L. Rev. 742. . 
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preme Court prior to publication, except to counsel, 
and before entry of judgment. As the reference to 
the Supreme Court would occur before entry of 
judgment in the Appellate Court, there would seem 
to be no doubt as to the possibility of such appeals 
by the state in criminal cases." 
Even though only the opinion below is con-
sidered by the Supreme Court, the effect upon the 
litigants will be such that their self-interest can be 
relieu upon tu fumi~h the Supreme Court an ade-
quate supply of briefs. The Supreme Court may 
adopt the opinion of the Appellate Court as its own, 
or write a substitute opinion, or combine the two 
--1-1. For a discussion of the problems involved in connection with 
such appeals, see Justin Miller, .. Appeals by the State in Criminal 
Cases" (1927), 36 Yale L. J_ 486: S. S. Z., ''Criminal Law-Criminal 
Procedure-Appeals by the State-Double Jeopardy" (1930), 4 So. Cal. 
L. Rev. 69, 
procedures. The Appellate Court will have the en-
tire responsibility of applying the opinion of the 
Supreme Court to the facts of the case. Any addi-
tional opinion rendered by the Appellate Court will 
be appealed in like manner. No opinions of trial 
courts should be published, thus eliminating the 
last possibility of the existence of conflicting opin-
ions within the jurisdiction. 
The administration of justice involves a great 
field of problems. The present proposal is but a 
single specific suggestion which it is believed may 
have a pJa.ce in aiding toward their solution. Adop-
tion of the present suggestion would make Su-
preme Court practice more expeditious and less ex-
pensive, and it is felt that at the same time it would 
increase the effectiveness of the court. 
